



An Iterative Algorithm for Profit Maximization by Market Equilibrium Constraints

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Outline

1. Introduction
2. Model Description
3. Comparison with an MCP Approach
4. Case Study
5. Conclusions



Introduction

- Two main approaches to model market equilibrium:
 - Cournot (firms compete only in quantities)
 - Supply function equilibrium (in quantities and prices)
- A great number of medium and long term oligopoly market models are based on Cournot equilibrium

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
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Model Description


- Based on a detailed production cost model
 - Detailed representation of operation constraints
 - Decision variables are generator output levels
 - Determine the cheapest **commitment** and operation of the **hydrothermal** system
- **Market equilibrium** among firms represented by a set of **additional constraints**. By these constraints each **strategic agent maximizes its profit** (revenues minus costs)
 - Determine the output level for each strategic firm
- **Advantage:**
 - use of any available production cost model (PCM)
- **Drawback:**
 - market equilibrium constraints depend on SMP, not directly

Production cost model with market equilibrium constraints




Utility function

- Market equilibrium obtained by maximizing consumer's and producer's surplus




Market equilibrium constraints



Iterative computation of system marginal price (*SMP*)


- Marginal cost (*MC*) of each firm *i* not directly calculated by the PCM due to discrete commitment decisions
- P_i output of firm *i*

$$P_i \leq \frac{SMP - MC_i(P_i)}{-\text{demand slope}}$$



Producer surplus

Producer
Surplus



Iterative algorithm for hydro scheduling of strategic firms

1. Obtain an **initial market equilibrium** by solving the optimization problem
2. Select a load level **L1** with high SMP where the **market equilibrium constraints are not binding** for some **strategic company**
3. Select a load level **L2** with lower SMP where the same company **can decrease its production**
4. Find a **fringe company** that can **decrease** its production in load level **L1** and simultaneously **increase** in load level **L2**
5. **Exchange the hydro generation** of the strategic and fringe companies among load levels taking into account the technical hydro constraints (i.e., maximum and minimum output, maximum and minimum reserve levels, etc.) and any other constraint (i.e, firm market share)
6. If two load levels with different SMP can be selected go to step 2. **In other case go to end**

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Comparison with a MCP approach

- Advantages of PCM with MEC approach
 - Realistic modeling of the electric system (e.g., binary unit commitment variables)
 - Robust and efficient solution methods (e.g., Branch and bound for MIP)
 - Constraints must be linear
 - Convergence not guaranteed but obtained in practice
- Advantages of MCP approach
 - Compact problem formulation
 - Only continuous variables
 - Possibility of introducing nonlinear constraints
 - Optimality guaranteed and solution uniqueness with linear constraints
 - Slow solution method and depending of the initial value

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
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Case study

- Time scope divided into 3 periods with 3 load levels for weekdays subperiod and 2 load levels for weekend subperiod
- 18 thermal units and 6 hydro units from 3 different firms
- SMP rises from 4.86 pta/kWh in cost minimization to 5.16 pta/kWh in market equilibrium
- Total profit increases in a 5 % while the energy produced decreases in a 10 %

System marginal price



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Conclusions

- **Market equilibrium** under an oligopoly based on the Cournot conjecture, represented by a **production cost model plus market equilibrium constraints**
- **Iterative algorithm** to calculate the **system marginal cost**
- **Iterative algorithm** to refine **hydro scheduling** for strategic firms
- **Resulting MIP problem** solved by robust, efficient and reliable solvers

